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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-2348 
________________ 
 
SHERWANE JEOVAL WILLIAMS, 
 
 Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Hon. Walter A. Durling 
(A055-962-616) 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on February 8, 2016 
 
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 31, 2016) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Petitioner Sherwane Williams seeks review of an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s decision pretermitting 
his application for cancellation of removal and directing his removal to Jamaica.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm the BIA’s order and deny Williams’s petition for 
review. 
I. 
 Williams, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident in December 2002.  Following his admission, Williams was twice convicted of 
unlawful possession of marijuana in violation of Virginia law.  The first offense occurred 
in December 2008, just over six years after Williams was admitted as a lawful permanent 
resident.  Williams’s second offense occurred in July 2010, approximately seven and one-
half years after his admission.  Williams was subsequently charged with removability for 
having a conviction relating to a controlled substance other than a single offense 
involving possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana for personal use.1  
During removal proceedings, Williams conceded his removability but argued that 
he was eligible for cancellation of removal.  To be eligible for cancellation of removal, a 
permanent resident must show, inter alia, that he has resided in the United States 
continuously for seven years after being admitted.2  Under the so-called “stop-time” rule, 
however, the continuous-residence period is deemed to end when an alien commits an 
                                              
1 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
2 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). 
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offense, like Williams’s first possession offense, that would otherwise render him 
inadmissible to the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).3  Because Williams 
committed his first offense six years after being admitted, he had not accrued enough 
time to be eligible for cancellation of removal.  Williams argued, however, that he could 
seek a waiver of inadmissibility as to the first offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) and 
thereby avoid the stop-time consequences of that offense. Williams also moved to 
withdraw his application for admission to the United States.  
The Immigration Judge ruled that Williams could not seek a Section 1182(h) 
waiver to avoid the stop-time rule and ordered Williams be removed to Jamaica.  The 
BIA affirmed, holding that Section 1182(h) waivers are only available to aliens seeking a 
visa, admission to the United States, or an adjustment of status.  This petition for review 
followed. 
II.4 
 We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, but afford Chevron deference 
to the BIA’s “reasonable” interpretation of the statutes it is charged with administering.5 
Williams claims that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) permits the Attorney General to waive the effect 
of his December 2008 offense and overcome the stop-time bar to cancellation of removal.  
We see no error in the BIA’s contrary ruling, and will therefore affirm.  
                                              
3 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). 
4The BIA had jurisdiction to review Williams’ petition pursuant to 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
5 Toussaint v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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 Under the INA, an alien who violates a state law relating to a controlled substance 
is inadmissible.6  Williams’s December 2008 marijuana offense was just such a violation, 
and therefore triggered the stop-time rule.7   Section 1182(h), however, provides that 
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of 
[Section 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)] insofar as it relates to a single offense of 
simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana if . . . the Attorney 
General, in his discretion . . . has consented to the alien’s applying or 
reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of 
status.8 
 
Williams argues that permanent residents may invoke this provision to “waive” a 
low-level marijuana possession offense that would otherwise trigger the stop-time bar to 
cancellation of removal.  As the BIA correctly observed, however, Section 1182(h) by its 
very terms applies only when an alien is “applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission 
to the United States, or adjustment of status.”9   Cancellation of removal is not one of 
these enumerated categories.  Absent any indication that Congress intended to permit an 
alien to seek a Section 1182(h) waiver in conjunction with an application for cancellation 
of removal, Williams’s claim must fail. 
The BIA’s decision in Matter of Bustamante,10 relied on heavily by the petitioner, 
undercuts rather than supports his argument.  In Bustamante, the BIA considered whether 
a nonpermanent resident applying for cancellation of removal could seek to waive a 
                                              
6 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
7 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). 
8 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
9 Id. 
10 25 I. & N. Dec. 564 (BIA 2011). 
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disqualifying conviction under Section 1182(h).  The BIA held that Section 1182(h) 
waives only the grounds of inadmissibility arising from the conviction, not the fact of the 
conviction itself.11  By the same logic, here, even if Section 1182(h) waivers were 
available to permanent residents applying for cancellation of removal (which they are 
not) the waiver would only waive the grounds of inadmissibility arising from Williams’s 
drug offense, not the fact of the offense itself.  Williams still would be subject to the stop-
time rule as an alien who “has committed an offense referred to in [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)] that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States.”12 
Finally, Williams argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his application 
for admission into the United States.  Williams, however, has already been admitted to 
the United States.  By regulation, an immigration judge is only permitted to allow an 
arriving alien to withdraw an application for admission—not one who is already lawfully 
admitted.13  The BIA therefore correctly refused to permit Williams to withdraw his 
application for admission. 
III. 
We acknowledge that Williams is paying a heavy price for what seem to be trivial 
drug possession offenses.  The narrow question before us, however, is whether the BIA 
                                              
11 Id. at 567. 
12 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1); see also Sanchez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 
2009) (“A statute giving the Attorney General discretion to grant relief from 
inadmissibility does not give the Attorney General discretion to grant relief from 
removal.”) (emphasis in original). 
13 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(d); United States v. Cisneros-Resendiz, 656 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
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erred as a matter of law in rejecting his appeal.  The statutory scheme, as drafted, simply 
does not authorize the relief that Williams seeks.  Accordingly, and for the foregoing 
reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the BIA and deny Williams’s petition for review. 
